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Abstract 
 
The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986) is 
probably the most widely used measure of cognitive vulnerability to anxiety.  
However, there have been periodic doubts expressed about whether it measures 
beliefs about the negative consequences of anxiety symptoms, as it purports to, or 
actual anxiety experiences.  The present study investigated the construct validity of 
the revised ASI using a cognitive interviewing approach.  Sixteen outpatients with 
anxiety problems responded to ASI-R items and items from another measure of 
vulnerability to anxiety, the Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale, while thinking aloud.  
The resulting verbal protocols were coded according to the apparent cognitive 
processes respondents engaged in when answering the items.  Responses to the 
revised ASI-R more often entailed retrieval of past episodes of anxiety, and 
participants more frequently formulated their responses based on judgments of the 
occurrence or intensity of feelings rather than on the appraisal of anticipated 
consequences of what was described in the items.  These findings potentially have 
significant implications for interpretation of results from the large body of literature 
using the different versions of the ASI. 
 
                                                Construct validity  
 
 3          
 
 
Research into cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and its model of 
psychopathology (Beck, 1976; Beck & Emery, 1985) has embraced a wide variety 
of methodologies but, in common with much of psychology, has had a particular 
affinity for questionnaire-based research.  This has been the basis of a number of 
criticisms (Brown, MacLeod, Tata, & Goddard, 2002; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; 
Hammen & Krantz, 1985; Hollon & Bemis, 1981; Segal, 1988).  To different 
degrees, these criticisms share a concern about whether scores on putative 
cognitive measures have been shown conclusively to reflect variations in the 
underlying target phenomena or, indeed, whether they actually measure cognition.  
This focus echoes recent trends in measurement theory (Embretson, 1983; 
Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden, 2004) that seek to address the 
limitations of the accepted notions of construct validity.  In particular, these authors 
have questioned sufficiency of the prevailing paradigm, within which the validity of 
an instrument rests on establishing a pattern of findings that is consistent with the 
relevant theory (epitomized by Cronbach and Meehl’s, 1955, so-called 
“nomological net”).   Meanwhile, within the growing methodology subfield known as 
cognitive aspects of survey methodology (CASM; Lessler, Tourangeau, & Salter, 
1989) the technique of cognitive interviewing has been developed to identify the 
mechanisms involved in responding to self-report instruments to help ensure that 
these plausibly reflect the intended underlying target phenomena.   
  
The central concern of the critics of the classical notion of construct validity is its 
susceptibility to inferential ambiguity, particularly lack of a basis for distinguishing 
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the preferred interpretation of a pattern of associations from a less preferred one 
that explains the pattern just as well.  Within the CBT literature, it was precisely 
criticisms along these lines that were at the heart of an energetic debate 
concerning the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 
1986), one of the most widely used measures of cognitive vulnerability to anxiety.  
Anxiety sensitivity is defined as the fear of anxiety symptoms based on beliefs 
about their harmful consequences.  The psychometric soundness of the ASI has 
been amply documented (Cox, Borger, & Enns, 1999).  It correlates with and 
predicts measures of fear and panic; for example, it was shown to predict the 
development of panic attacks following stressful military training (Schmidt, Lerew, 
& Jackson, 1997). The ASI is associated in particular with agoraphobia and panic 
disorder, in which the experience of the fear reaction itself is the major source of 
distress (Reiss, 1991). However, in the course of interchanges with ASI 
researchers, Lilienfeld and colleagues made a number of cogent criticisms of the 
ASI that raise significant questions about its validity: 
 
1.  Questionable face validity.  Lilienfeld, Jacob, and Turner (1989, p. 100) noted 
that “inspection of the item content of the ASI reveals that virtually all of the items 
appear to tap fear of anxiety and of anxiety symptoms (e.g., ‘It scares me when I 
am nervous,’ ‘When I notice that my heart is beating rapidly, I worry that I might 
have a heart attack’), rather than beliefs concerning the negative consequences of 
anxiety, as claimed by the test's developers.  [The authors] in effect make the 
unsubstantiated assumption that individuals who fear the consequences of anxiety 
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necessarily possess cognitions that anxiety has harmful consequences.”  
 
2.  Content overlap with criterion variables.  “[B]ecause the word “scare” or 
“scares” appears in eight of the ASI’s 16 items, a more parsimonious explanation 
for the partial correlation between the ASI and the [Fear Survey Schedule II] is that 
one measure of fear is highly associated with another measure of fear.”  (Lilienfeld, 
Turner, & Jacob, 1993., p. 168).   With regard to comparisons of ASI scores 
between panic and other diagnostic groups, they state “because many of the ASI’s 
items assess symptoms that are already known to be prevalent among panic 
disordered patients, such comparisons are not especially informative vis-a-vis the 
ASI’s construct validity and provide little or no new information regarding panic 
disorder” (Lilienfeld, Turner, & Jacob, 1996, p. 413). 
 
3.  Double-barreled items.  There is no way of knowing from a low score on an ASI 
item if the respondent does not often experience the sensation in question or if 
they experience it but are not scared of it.  “This could produce a spurious 
correlation between the ASI and panic disorder (as well as similar criteria), 
because panic disorder patients are more likely than other subjects to experience 
anxiety-related symptoms… Indeed, because many of the items on the ASI refer 
explicitly to panic symptoms, it may be this shared content, rather than the AS 
construct per se, that is primarily responsible for the ASI’s relation to panic disorder 
and related criteria”  (Lilienfeld et al., 1993, pp. 166-167).    
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Arguments as to the dimensionality of the ASI and its relationship to trait anxiety 
also featured in this debate.  However, the narrower criticisms summarized above 
pertaining to the basis upon which ASI scores vary are more fundamental and 
would potentially make these further considerations moot. 
 
The response of some ASI researchers has been largely to reassert the intended 
purpose of the ASI, namely to assess beliefs about the consequences of anxiety 
rather than the frequency of anxiety, without providing evidence that the ASI is a 
valid means for meeting this aim (Taylor, 1996, p. 433; Reiss, 1997, p. 208).  
However, other ASI researchers have acknowledged the aptness of these 
criticisms.  Thus, McNally (1999, p. 10) has concurred that the ASI does not, on its 
face, appear to assess beliefs, and that whether or not it does so in practice is a 
valid empirical question.  Similarly, Cox et al. (1999) have stated that “the question 
remains as to whether the ASI items assess beliefs independent of occurrences of 
relevant fear experiences” (p. 143).  
 
The present study was undertaken to investigate these aspects of the construct 
validity of an expanded version of the ASI, the ASI-R.  The ASI-R (Taylor & Cox, 
1998a) is a superset of the original ASI consisting of ten of the original 16 ASI 
items along with 26 novel items. The authors’ motivation in developing the ASI-R 
was to have available a large enough item set to settle the question of the 
dimensionality of the AS construct.  The instructions and the structure and wording 
of the items remained the same as for the original ASI.  The same can be said of 
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the more recent ASI-3 (Taylor et al., 2007), a verbatim subset of the ASI-R which 
also retains the same instructions.   As such, issues and criticisms related to the 
ASI are equally relevant to the ASI-R and ASI-3.   
 
While originally developed to explain panic disorder, the ASI-R is now more 
typically used across the range of anxiety disorders and, indeed, Axis I disorders in 
general (Schmidt et al, 2007; Taylor et al., 2007).  As such, the sixteen outpatients 
included in the present study presented with a variety of anxiety-related problems.   
Similarly, consistent with the considerable attention paid in the ASI literature to the 
question of uniformity of measurement across symptomatic and asymptomatic 
populations (Deacon, Abramowitz, Woods, & Tolin, 2003; Taylor et al., 2007), 
participants ranged across different stages of treatment.  Participants responded to 
ASI items and items from another measure of vulnerability to anxiety, the Anxiety 
Attitude and Belief Scale (AABS; Brown, Craske, Rassovsky, Tata, & Tsao, 2000), 
a scale developed with the aim of indexing beliefs independent of affect.  A 
cognitive interviewing procedure was used, and the resulting verbal protocols were 
coded according to the apparent cognitive processes respondents engaged in 
when answering the items.  The information provided permitted a direct test of the 
central assumption underlying the validity of the ASI, namely that it is a measure of 
beliefs rather than predominantly a measure of intensity and frequency of prior 
anxiety experiences.  The methodology also permitted a more general examination 
of whether participants were responding as intended to the ASI instructions.   
 
Method 
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Participants 
The 16 participants (10 female, 6 male) were patients of an adult psychology 
outpatient department and were included if their primary presenting problem was 
anxiety.  ICD-10 diagnostic classifications given by their clinician were: 
agoraphobia without panic disorder (N = 1), agoraphobia with panic disorder (N = 
2), social phobia (N = 4), other anxiety disorder (N = 3), panic disorder (N = 4), 
generalized anxiety disorder (N = 1), and obsessive compulsive disorder (N = 1).  
Participants were interviewed after assessment (N = 7), or during (N = 4) or after 
(N = 5) individual or group treatment.  The sample was mostly White (N = 12) with 
one Black participant and three declining to state their ethnicity).  Mean age was 
37.5 (SD = 12.8, range = 21 to 64 years).  Potential participants were excluded if 
their English was not fluent or if they had cognitive deficits (head injury or learning 
disability).  Participation was voluntary.  Participants were not compensated, 
although travel expenses were reimbursed. 
 
Measures 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index – Revised (ASI-R).  According to Reiss’s expectancy 
theory, anxiety sensitivity (AS) is the “fear of fear,” said to arise from the belief that 
the experience of anxiety has negative consequences, including illness, 
embarrassment or additional anxiety (Reiss, 1991). The Anxiety Sensitivity Index 
aims to index such beliefs.  AS is supposed to amplify fear and anxiety reactions, 
playing a role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders, especially 
panic disorder and agoraphobia.  The large body of research using the ASI has 
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been extensively reviewed (Cox et al, 1999; McNally, 1999; Taylor, 1996).   The 
ASI-R is an expanded Anxiety Sensitivity Index, consisting of 36 items.  The 
respondent is asked to rate how applicable the item is to them in terms of their 
agreement, from very little to very much, with what the item states.    
 
Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale (AABS).  The AABS is a 58-item scale that aims 
to index beliefs and attitudes which constitute a cognitive vulnerability to anxiety 
(Brown et al., 2000). Items were derived from the literature on cognitive-behavioral 
approaches to anxiety disorders and refined by a poll of 17 researchers prominent 
in the area.  Items are worded so that they do not refer to or presuppose the 
occurrence of anxiety symptoms.  Participants indicate endorsement on a seven 
point Likert scale from Totally disagree to Totally agree.  Brown et al. found three 
underlying dimension of the AABS:  Vigilance-Avoidance, Catastrophizing, and 
Imagination. The scale and factor subscales were reliable, with alpha coefficients 
ranging between .72 and .82 for the factors and .87 for the scale as a whole.   
 
Procedure 
Sampling of Items.   The time-intensive nature of the think aloud protocols 
collected in the course of cognitive interviewing precluded having all participants 
answer all items.  Therefore, in order that each item was completed by four 
participants, each participant completed approximately one quarter of the items:  
nine (of the 36) randomly selected ASI-R items and 15 (of the 58) AABS items.  
This produced a total of 144 item protocols for the ASI-R and 240 item protocols 
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for AABS. 
 
Collection of cognitive interviews 
The interview schedule was constructed based on recommendations for 
conducting cognitive interviews (Willis, 2005) and think-aloud protocol analysis 
(Green & Gilhooly, 1996).  Participants were first familiarized and permitted to 
become comfortable with the task of thinking aloud.  They were randomly assigned 
to complete either ASI-R or AABS items first.  Interviewer input was limited to 
prompting to think aloud if silent, and the interviewer sat out of view to avoid 
influencing participants.   Interviews were recorded and the recordings were 
transcribed for analysis.  Following the think aloud task, participants were 
debriefed and further information was gathered about their experience of 
answering the questionnaire items. 
 
Analytic approach 
As a framework for analyzing the resulting protocols, Chi’s (1997) verbal analysis 
method was adapted.  According to Chi, “this quantitative-based qualitative 
approach basically operationalizes one's subjective impression by coding the 
verbal evidence for that impression and comparing the frequencies of the codes 
quantitatively” (Chi, 1997, p. 277).  Chi’s approach offers a generalization of 
Ericsson and Simon’s (1984) protocol analysis method to less highly structured, 
“real world” contexts.  She outlines eight basic steps that are followed to a greater 
or lesser extent or omitted depending on the aims and subject matter of the 
research in question.  The following three of Chi’s steps were seen as relevant to 
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the present study:  segmenting the protocols, developing or choosing a coding 
scheme or formalism, and operationalizing evidence in the coded protocols.  Each 
step is described in detail, below.  
 
Segmenting of protocols.   Verbal protocols were transcribed and the entire 
protocol for each participant was segmented.  Segmentation was based on the 
identification of separate thoughts, ideas, or cognitive processes within the 
protocols.  Independent blind coders segmented transcripts for five respondents 
using initial criteria.   Four undergraduate students served as raters and followed a 
basic set of written instructions directing them to identify segments within the 
protocols representing separate ideas or cognitive processes.  Mean inter-coder 
segmentation agreement was 81%.  Disagreements were reconciled by one of the 
authors (NCH), the criteria were clarified, and a single coder segmented the 
remaining transcripts accordingly.   
 
Developing the coding scheme   
Using content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980), as applied to think-aloud protocols 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Green & Gilhooly, 1996), an iterative procedure was 
followed to develop category codes for describing the cognitive processes 
reported.  The starting point was the standard set of stages employed within the 
cognitive interviewing approach to analyze the process of responding to self report 
questions:  comprehension, retrieval, judgment formation, response selection, and 
verification/editing (Tourangeau, 1984).  Likewise, the initial codes applied were 
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drawn from the conventional nomenclature within the CASM paradigm 
(Tourangeau, 1984) and from existing cognitive interviewing codes used in a 
previous questionnaire evaluation study (Bickhart & Felcher, 1996).  The codes 
were initially applied to the first two participants’ protocols.  Two or more codes 
could be applied to a single segment when more than one distinct process was 
clearly indicated in that segment.  Disagreements and uncoded segments were 
discussed and codes added or adjusted accordingly.  Existing concepts and labels 
were used if they matched well with those obtained from the data; however, novel 
sub-codes were developed where necessary to better capture the specific anxiety-
related content.  Resulting codes were re-applied to the first two protocols and 
refined further.  The final set of codes was then applied to the entire set of 
protocols from all participants.  Disagreements were resolved in discussion 
between the two raters where possible, and a third rater arbitrated unresolved 
disagreements.   
 
Categories were denoted by a three-digit code.  The first digit referred to the stage 
of processing taking place in the segment, the second to the specific process being 
employed, and the third to the content of the segment.  The first two digits reflect 
the standard CASM codes and the last the more refined categorization related to 
the specific content of the questionnaires.  Thus, a code of 221 would be used to 
refer to a segment in which the stage of processing was retrieval (2 in the first digit 
related to stage of processing), an episode from memory was being recalled (2 in 
the second digit related to the specific process) and that episode concerned the 
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occurrence of anxiety related to the self (1 in the third digit related to content).  A 
code of 241 would also pertain to retrieval of anxiety information about the self 
(first code and last codes again 2 and 1), but the 4 rather than 2 for the middle digit 
denoted recall of general information rather than recall of a specific episode.  All 
codes are listed in Table 1.   
Insert Table 1 around here 
Mean inter-coder reliability for the final codes for the initial blind coding was 71% 
agreement.  This was felt to reflect a sufficient consensus between raters in light of 
the fact that agreement was defined strictly as complete agreement on all codes, 
when there were up to 47 possible codes, and it was possible to apply more than 
one to each segment.  If segments where both coders used the same code but one 
also used an additional code were counted as agreements, reliability rose to 82%. 
Agreement rate on process only (with potential disagreement on the content of that 
process) was 87%.  Agreement was 91% on stage of processing.  The two initial 
coders resolved 98% of codes, and the remaining 2% were arbitrated by a third 
rater. 
Results 
 
Operationalizing evidence in the coded protocols   
Comprehension.   Certain responses can indicate potential difficulties for 
respondents in understanding or complying with what is being requested of them.  
Three of these were focused upon.  Responses categorized as “recasting” entailed 
respondents changing the wording of an item before answering.  For example, one 
respondent before responding to the ASI-R item “When I feel dizzy, I worry there is 
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something wrong with my brain” stated “No. I worry there’s something wrong with 
my blood pressure.”  In “specifying” the respondent applies limiting conditions to 
their response:  “I totally agree with that one.  For myself, anyway.”  Finally, a 
respondent might note in some way that an item is ambiguous to them.  Neither 
the ASI-R or AABS showed excessive comprehension problems, with recasting 
occurring in 10.4% and 8.3% of protocols, respectively, and either specifying or 
ambiguity occurring in 12.5% of protocols for each scale. 
 
A further evaluation of the comprehension of and adherence to the ASI-R 
instructions was carried out through examination of the retrieval codes 
“inapplicable” (210) and “hypothetical” (codes in the 23x range).   According to the 
ASI-R instructions, if an item describes a situation that is not applicable to the 
respondent, they are to answer hypothetically, as if the situation in question was 
applicable. Twelve of the 16 respondents at some point stated that an ASI-R item 
was not applicable to them (this did not occur for any AABS protocols), and this 
took place in 24 of the 144 ASI-R item protocols (16.7%).  Hypothetical codes co-
occurred with inapplicable codes for 17 (70.8%) of the 24 protocols, suggesting 
that respondents were following instructions for the most part.  However, it also 
suggests that a small but appreciable percentage of responses (N = 7, or about 
5% of all ASI-R protocols) were not being made on any apparent valid basis, as 
the item was inapplicable but a hypothetical response was not verbalized. 
  
Retrieval.    The prior debates regarding the validity of the ASI reviewed in the 
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introduction reflect a consensus on both sides that a scale operationalizing the 
cognitive component of the CBT theory of emotional disorders should mainly vary 
on the basis of representation and appraisal processes and not on the basis of 
retrieval of experiences of an affective state, especially if that affective state is 
meant to be predicted by the scale in question.   In fact, to access and report a 
belief, it should not be necessary to retrieve instances from autobiographical 
episodic memory, and such retrievals should arguably only occur in a minority of 
responses.  In this regard, one of the authors of the ASI has stated, “…anxiety 
sensitivity predicts future fearfulness based on the degree of endorsement of the 
beliefs assessed by the ASI, regardless of the frequency or the intensity of anxiety 
experiences in the past…’past experiences of anxiety’ and ‘beliefs about the 
consequences of anxiety’ are different phenomena…”  (Reiss, 1997, p. 208). To 
evaluate the ASI-R and AABS in this respect, self-relevant anxiety retrievals 
(codes 221 and 241) were tallied, representing segments in which respondents 
recalled specific episodes or summary knowledge of their own past anxiety 
experiences.  Twenty-five ASI-R protocols (17.4%) and 15 AABS protocols (6.3%) 
contained anxiety retrievals.  The difference in proportions was significant, Χ2(1, 
384) =  p < .001, corrected p = .021.1 Twenty (56%) of the 36 ASI-R items and 11 
(19%) of the 58 AABS items produced self-relevant anxiety retrievals; this 
difference in proportions was also significant (Χ2 (1, 94) = 7.37, p < .01).   
 
Judgment Formation.  Judgment formation refers to whatever processing is carried 
out to formulate the required response following comprehension of the item and 
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retrieval of any material from memory.  Even after retrieving memories of anxiety 
episodes, ASI respondents might still, as ASI researchers assume, largely rely on 
appraisals about the consequences of anxiety to develop their responses.   
Appraisals identified in the current study fell into three categories:  reasoning (i.e., 
logical inferences, code 311), imperatives (e.g., “should” type judgments, code 
312), and arbitrary conclusions (propositional statements made without any 
specified basis, code 313).  The remaining non-appraisal judgment formations 
were based on the reported occurrence, intensity, or frequency of cognitions (340 
codes), behaviors (320 codes), or feelings (340 codes) within the respondent’s 
experience.  In practice, only feelings produced intensity-based judgment 
formations.  Examples of segments assigned each judgment formation code are 
shown in Table 2.    
Insert Table 2 about here 
The distinction between appraisal and cognition occurrence codes primarily hinged 
on whether the respondent made a verifiable appraisal while answering the 
question (e.g., “I don’t think there is anything wrong with me”) or was relating the 
past occurrence of a cognition (“I don’t usually think, ‘There is something wrong 
with me.’”). The majority of AABS protocols (52.9%) but only a minority of ASI-R 
protocols (20.8%) contained appraisals (see Table 3), suggesting that the AABS is 
more accurately characterized as a measure of appraisals than the ASI-R.   
Cognition occurrence codes were used for 10.4% of the AABS protocols and 
20.8% of the ASI-R protocols.  Either appraisal or cognition codes were used in 
59.2% of the AABS protocols and 38.9% of the ASI-R protocols. 
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Judgment formations apart from those intended by the designers of a scale may or 
may not be relevant to a scale’s validity.  For example, judgments made on the 
basis of the perceived occurrence of behaviors would not represent an obvious 
confound for a scale meant to predict anxiety, especially if these did not 
predominate.  Consistent with this, respondents relied in modest proportions on 
estimation of the occurrence of behaviors in forming their answers (3.5% for the 
ASI-R and 6.3% for the AABS).  In contrast, a substantial proportion of feeling-
based judgments in a scale intended to predict future affect, even if these do not 
predominate, confounds predictor and criterion and therefore seriously threatens 
validity.  Such was the case for the ASI-R, with feelings-based judgment 
formations (both occurrence and intensity) being identified in the majority (56.9%) 
of protocols as compared to a minority (12.1%) of AABS protocols. The ASI-R 
instructions do not specify whether frequency or intensity is intended to be the 
basis for respondent judgments of how true an item is for them; however, 
according to the breakdown in Table 3, it is clear that respondents largely based 
their judgments on the perceived frequency of the occurrence of feelings.  Twenty 
of 58 AABS items produced feeling-based judgments, whereas nearly all (34 of 36) 
ASI-R items did.  The difference in proportions was significant (Χ2 (1,94) = 32.67, p 
< .001). 
 
As McNally (1999, p. 10) has noted, AS researchers assume that statements such 
as “It scares me when my heart beats rapidly,” which appear to be concerned with 
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affective reactions, imply beliefs about the negative consequences of the 
phenomenon in question (here, rapid heartbeat).  Although explicit appraisals 
occurred in only 30 of 144 ASI-R protocols, AS researchers might assume that 
feelings-based judgment formations indirectly reflect implicit appraisals of this sort.  
As such, associations between feelings-based judgment formations and explicit 
appraisals were examined, under the assumption that the rate of explicit appraisals 
might mirror the rate of implicit appraisals.  In fact, explicit appraisals were found to 
be just as likely to co-occur with feelings-based judgment formations (16 of 30 
protocols) as with their absence (14/30), suggesting no apparent relationship 
between feeling-based judgment formations and stated or unstated appraisals.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
Response selection.   While the operations involved in answering self-report items 
are conceived of as forming successive stages, these stages do not necessarily 
occur in the assumed sequence of comprehension, retrieval, judgment, and 
response selection, and particular stages are sometimes omitted.  Which stages 
appear in protocols and their order can provide further information about an 
instrument.  For instance, relatively late response selection may reflect effortful 
processing that does not draw on immediately available online knowledge and can 
indicate problems with wording, comprehensibility, or applicability (e.g., Bassili & 
Scott, 1996).  Conversely, it is argued within the protocol analysis and cognitive 
interviewing literatures (Conrad, Blair & Tracy, 1999) that beliefs and appraisals 
draw on semantic knowledge and so should be directly reportable without retrieval 
from episodic memory.  Therefore, the sequencing of response selection relative to 
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other codes was considered for the ASI-R and AABS-R.  As shown in Table 4, 
response selection was typically the last operation carried out for ASI-R items 
(54.2% of protocols), following all other operations.  For the AABS, response 
selections more frequently occurred either as the sole reported cognitive process 
(25.4% of protocols) or prior to all other codes (39.2% of protocols), Χ2 (3, N = 384) 
= 28.23, corrected p = .017, which is more consistent with the report of beliefs 
drawn from semantic memory than the retrieval of experiences from episodic 
memory.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Discussion 
The ASI is a popular measure, widely used beyond its initially intended purpose of 
assessing fear of fear.  However, periodic concerns have been raised about its 
construct validity and, in particular, whether it measures what it purports to 
measure, namely beliefs about the negative consequences of anxiety symptoms.  
In contrast to the usual strategy taken to analyzing construct validity, in which this 
is inferred from a pattern of associations, the present study examined in a more 
directly empirical fashion the reports of the thought processes actually engaged in 
by respondents answering the scale items in order to develop an idea of what 
accounts for variation in ASI-R scores.  Compared to the responses to the AABS, a 
measure constructed with the aim of assessing beliefs independent of affect, 
responses to the ASI-R more often entailed retrieval of past episodes of anxiety.  
Moreover, ASI-R respondents frequently formulated their responses based on 
judgments of the occurrence or intensity of feelings rather than on the appraisal of 
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anticipated consequences of what was described in the items.     
 
The authors of the ASI sought to develop a measure of individual differences in the 
appraisal of body sensations, particularly anxiety symptoms.  However, rather than 
writing items that directly inquire about appraisals of these sensations (e.g., “A 
racing heart is a sign of something seriously wrong.”), the authors relied on items 
concerning the amplified reaction thought to follow from the appraisal (“It scares 
me when my heart beats rapidly”).  The fact that the implied appraisal occurred 
somewhere in the response sequence was taken for granted.  The self report of 
the amplified reaction that was assumed to result from the appraisal was seen as 
sufficient evidence of its operation.  Indeed, it is generally reasonable to infer from 
someone’s reaction that they have appraised a situation as threatening, for why 
else would they be scared?  It is the reasonableness of this type of inference that 
underpins the ASI-R’s face validity for appraisals.  However, the root of the ASI-R’s 
potential shortcomings stems from the fact that it is simultaneously, and arguably 
more straightforwardly, face valid as a measure of affect.  
 
Although it may be reasonable to attribute a person’s affective reaction on a given 
occasion to an implied appraisal, there is little basis for assuming that this is what 
ASI-R respondents are referring to when they provide their responses or that 
scores reflect the operation of such appraisal processes.  To infer that ratings 
provided by respondents to the ASI reflect their global degree of belief in the 
implied appraisal would require an assumption that either (1) the rating of affective 
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response (how “scared” the respondent would be) is necessarily isometric with the 
respondent’s typical degree of belief in the underlying appraisal, (2) that the 
respondent intuits that they are to disregard the affective response highlighted by 
the item wording and to focus instead on whatever appraisals they typically make 
so as to make a rating of degree of belief rather than degree of affect, or (3) that 
relevant appraisals will arise spontaneously and inevitably in the course of 
responding as requested.   The first two possibilities are implausible, with the 
second additionally contradicted by the current results:   most often, respondents 
based their ASI-R responses not on the degree to which they held a belief about 
the dangerousness of the body sensation in question, but rather based on the 
intensity or perceived rate of occurrence of their affective (“scares me”) response.  
Of the listed alternatives, the current results offer qualified support for the third 
possibility.  It does appear that appraisals played a role in an appreciable minority 
of ASI-R protocols.  However, their appearance was sporadic and often secondary 
to the affect based judgment formations that appeared in nearly twice the number 
of protocols as appraisals.   
 
Furthermore, it was found that respondents frequently formulated ratings not just 
on the basis of the intensity of their remembered affective reactions but also by 
judging how often such reactions occurred.  On the basis of a review of the 
literature on emotional self report, Robinson and Clore (2002) concluded that 
global judgments such as these are likely to arise when the referent of an item 
(fainting, heart racing) is something with which the respondent has not had 
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immediate or frequent experience.  Respondents asked to estimate emotional 
responses that are not sufficiently immediate do not base their responses on 
situation-specific beliefs tied to discrete memories (which is what the ASI-R 
assumes) but instead base them on identity-related beliefs more reflective of the 
individual’s perception of their overall temperament and personality.  In these 
circumstances, responses on the ASI-R are likely to be removed further still from 
any putative underlying appraisal processes.   
 
The foregoing highlights the fact that items on the ASI-R presuppose previous 
experience of the body sensations in question or, in the absence of previous 
experience, the ability to evaluate these hypothetically.  This contributes to a 
number of difficulties, particularly when items are inapplicable, as was the case for 
a substantial proportion of items even within the current anxiety disorder sample.  
The ASI-R instructions specifically direct respondents to answer inapplicable items 
hypothetically.  In most cases in the current study an inapplicable code (210) was 
accompanied by a hypothetical retrieval code (230), suggesting that the 
respondents were following instructions in these cases for the most part (although 
whether the hypothetical pertained to the inapplicable aspect of the item was not 
verified).  Still, 5% of items were inapplicable without an accompanying 
hypothetical.   Although this is a small proportion, a mathematical simulation study 
has shown that it is large enough to produce serious distortions in psychometric 
analyses.  Waller (1989) studied the general case in which items are inapplicable 
because they share an unmet prerequisite and found that as small an inapplicable 
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rate as 5% can lead to substantially inflated correlations between items and the 
resulting extraction of spurious or distorted factors.    
 
The issue of greater or lesser applicability has potentially far-reaching 
consequences for all versions of the ASI.  Schwarz and colleagues (see Schwarz, 
1999 for a review) have shown that individuals responding to items that are less 
applicable to them are much more likely to be affected by the context, sequencing, 
and wording of items than individuals for whom the subject matter is more 
continually accessible, resulting in greater instability of measurement in the former 
populations and lack of measurement invariance across populations.  Consistent 
with this, Deacon, et al. (2003) found in a factor analysis of the revised ASI-R 
cross-validated in two large undergraduate samples that items concerned with 
somatic sensations loaded on factors that appeared to differ on the basis of item 
wording (being scared of anxiety symptoms versus being worried about the 
potentially catastrophic consequences of such symptoms) as compared to Taylor 
and Cox’s (1998b) original analysis in a clinical population, in which items loaded 
according to domain of somatic sensation (cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, etc.).     
Deacon et al. attribute this to the inapplicability of these items in a non-clinical 
sample:  “it is possible that individuals without clinically significant anxiety 
symptoms may have difficulty identifying specific feared consequences of somatic 
sensations, even when these sensations are feared” (p. 1446).  Indeed, it has 
proven difficult to identify a stable factor structure of the ASI-R within non-clinical 
populations, let alone one that is related to the structure found in clinical 
                                                Construct validity  
 
 24          
 
 
populations (Zvolensky et al., 2003).  The potential for the factor scores of the ASI 
variants to be unstable and substantially based on spurious statistical artifacts is a 
serious concern, and particularly so for the ASI-R, as arguments for its validity are 
in large part based upon studies of its factor structure (Taylor & Cox, 1998a; Taylor 
& Cox, 1998b; Taylor et al., 2007; Zinbarg, Barlow, & Brown, 1997).   
 
The present study is based on the premise that it is important for a cognitive 
measure to reflect variance in cognitive mechanisms.  As self evident as this might 
seem to most, it is reasonable to ask whether it is critical that actual cognitions are 
demonstrated to underlie responses to the ASI-R.  Glass and Arnkoff (1997) have 
suggested that, whether or not self-report inventories yield a veridical report of 
actual internal dialogue, the evidence is that clients are still conveying something 
clinically meaningful about themselves (p. 917).  In a similar vein, it could be 
argued that because a large body of literature appears to document that the ASI-R 
“works,” that is, that it shows relevant predictive validity, the details of its underlying 
mechanics are secondary.  However, this is an argument based on the quantity of 
the evidence rather than on the sensibleness of the evidence.  Furthermore, if the 
present findings are given credence, it would follow that much of the previous 
literature should be reconsidered in light of the fact that the ASI-R appears to be at 
least equally a measure of affective as cognitive processes.   
 
A natural place to start a reconsideration of ASI research would be the study by 
Schmidt et al. (1997) of 1,014 US air force cadets in basic training, as this study 
                                                Construct validity  
 
 25          
 
 
represented a watershed for the ASI.  Schmidt et al found that the ASI predicted 
future panic attacks after accounting for panic attack history.  It also predicted 
future anxiety after controlling for current levels of anxiety and trait anxiety.  The 
latter finding was regarded as addressing one of the criticisms of the ASI put forth 
by Lillienfeld and colleagues with respect to the potential confounding of the ASI 
with trait anxiety.  However, to regard these findings as evidence supporting the 
distinctness of AS from trait anxiety depends on acceptance of the preferred 
interpretation of the incremental variance explained by the ASI as being due to 
cognitive appraisal.  The possibility that the incremental variance is due to anxiety 
measured by the ASI that is not shared with the trait anxiety measure is equally 
consistent with the pattern of results.  A conclusive choice of one explanation over 
the other requires evidence from a separate source about the mechanisms 
underlying ASI responses.  As Borsboom and colleagues (2004) state:  “…tables 
of correlations between test scores and other measures cannot provide more than 
circumstantial evidence for validity.  What needs to be tested is not a theory about 
the relation between the attribute measured and other attributes but a theory of 
response behavior.  Somewhere in the chain of events that occurs between item 
administration and item response, the measured attribute must play a causal role 
in determining what value the measurement’s outcomes will take; otherwise, the 
test cannot be valid for measuring the attribute” (p. 1062).  The present study 
appears to contradict the prevailing assumptions about what processes underlie 
ASI-R scores. 
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The clearest potential limitation of the current study is that raters were not blind to 
the study hypothesis.  This was necessary in order to establish the rating system.  
The raters strove to remain impartial; however, subsequent research using this 
approach will be more convincing if blind raters are used.  In addition, the sample 
size employed, while actually fairly large for a protocol analysis study, could be 
seen as limiting generalizability.   However, the magnitude of the effects found 
makes it unlikely that the results would be different with substantially different 
participants.  For example, in order to reduce the nearly 60% affect  judgment 
formation rate of the ASI-R to 25%, twelve participants who provided 100% 
cognitive judgment formations for ASI-R items would need to be added.  To further 
reduce this to the 10% affect rate found for the AABS, 59 such participants would 
need to be added.    
 
Another potential objection is to the make-up of the sample, which ranged across 
the anxiety disorders, with a minority of six of 16 participants receiving the ASI-R 
target diagnosis of panic disorder and some participants having advanced at least 
partially through psychotherapy.  However, as noted in the introduction, a sample 
limited only to panic disorder would not represent the full range of populations in 
which ASI-R research is typically carried out.  Whether responding affirmatively to 
having experienced a specific body sensation, as many with panic are likely to do, 
or responding negatively, as those with other disorders or, for example, 
undergraduates are likely to do, responses need to be made on a valid basis 
reflecting variance (including presence and absence) in the underlying 
                                                Construct validity  
 
 27          
 
 
phenomenon of interest.  Indeed, as discussed above, it is precisely when items 
are less applicable that the ASI-R’s validity is most suspect.  It is not evident how 
proscribing use of the ASI-R outside of a symptomatic panic disorder population 
would obviate these shortcomings.    
 
The present study sought to examine the fundamental validity of the ASI-R, an 
instrument considered a gold standard in its area whose validity has typically been 
taken for granted.  It is especially important to scrutinize a scale like the ASI-R in 
the manner of this study as the built-in confounding of predictor and criterion, as 
appears to be the case with the ASI, is a particularly insidious validity threat that 
will likely obscure rather than advance the research involved.  The problems with 
all the versions of the ASI appear to stem from the unnecessarily indirect manner 
in which its authors chose to measure appraisal of body sensations.  It is likely that 
a more straightforward approach will advance the field more unambiguously.   
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Footnotes 
1 Chi-square analyses involving protocols violated the usual assumption of 
independence of observations.  The appropriate correction was therefore carried 
out for this and all subsequent analyses at the level of protocols (rather than at the 
level of participants or items) using the SPSS Complex Samples procedure.  The 
stated statistics and significance levels reflect this correction. 
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Table 1 
 
 The coding system 
 
 
Process Content 
Stage:  Comprehension 
110 Restates question 
 
120 Difficulty  121 Easy 
       assessment 122 Difficult 
130 Thinking  
140 Changes question 141 Recasting 
 142 Specifying 
150 Ambiguity  
160 Re-reads   
       instructions 
 
Stage:  Retrieval 
 
210 Inapplicable 
 
220 Recall episodes 221 Recall episodes, self, anxiety-relevant 
 222 Recall episodes, self, anything else 
 223 Recall episodes, others, anxiety-related 
 224 Recall episodes, others, anything else 
230 Hypothetical 231 Hypothetical, anxiety-relevant 
 232 Hypothetical, anything else 
240 General  241 General knowledge, self, anxiety-relevant 
       knowledge 242 General knowledge, self, anything else 
 243 General knowledge, others, anxiety-relevant 
 244 General knowledge, others, anything else 
 245 General knowledge about anything else 
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Process Content 
Stage:  Judgment formation 
 310 Appraisal 311 Reasoning 
 312 Imperative 
 313 Arbitrary conclusion 
320 Behavior  321 Behavior, non-zero frequency 
       occurrence 322 Behavior, zero frequency 
 323 Behavior, positive qualitative frequency assessment 
 324 Behavior, negative qualitative frequency assessment 
330 Feeling occurrence 331 Feeling, non-zero frequency 
 332 Feeling, zero frequency 
 333 Feeling, positive qualitative frequency assessment 
 334 Feeling, negative qualitative frequency assessment 
 335 Feeling, positive qualitative intensity assessment 
 336 Feeling, negative qualitative intensity assessment 
340 Cognition  341 Cognition, non-zero frequency 
       occurrence 342 Cognition, zero frequency 
 343 Cognition, positive qualitative frequency assessment 
 344 Cognition, negative qualitative frequency assessment 
Stage:  Response selection 
410 Select direction 411 Select direction, agreement 
 412 Select direction, disagreement 
420 Select response  
Stage:  Verify/Edit 
510 Judge social      
       desirability 
 
520 Justify response  
530 Certainty  531 Certain 
       assessment 532 Uncertain 
600  Other 610 Miscellaneous 
 620 Uncodable 
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Table 2 
Examples of judgment formations from the verbal protocols 
Judgment 
formation 
(code) 
Item Verbal protocol (showing segmentation) 
Appraisal:  
Reasoning 
(311) 
There’s a high probability of 
rejection in most social 
situations. (AABS). 
“…Depends on how you approach the social 
situation. /And if you went into a social situation 
imagining you’ll be rejected, / then actually you 
could probably make that happen.” 
Appraisal:  
Imperative 
(312) 
When I begin to sweat in a 
social situation I fear people 
will think negatively of me.  
(ASI-R) 
“Yes, because I was when I was young I used to 
get a lot of anxiety sweating / um and I used to 
hate it / um and find it terribly embarrassing / 
and I don’t yeah and I, / I would not want people 
to see it / so I agree with that very much / 
although it doesn’t tend to happen now but it 
used to.”  
Appraisal:  
Arbitrary 
conclusion 
(313) 
It is important for me not to 
appear nervous. (ASI-R) 
“Um, it is to a certain degree. /Although, I’ve 
always been nervous, /I know I appear nervous 
/and it is actually fine /so although I would like to 
appear less nervous I think I’m quite 
comfortable appearing just the way I am, / which 
is a little um, a little or some 
Feeling 
occurrence 
(331) 
When my chest feels tight, I 
get scared that I won’t be 
able to breathe properly. 
(ASI-R) 
“Um / I don’t get scared that I won’t be able to 
breathe properly, /but I do get anxious. / So, I 
would agree some with that.” 
Feeling 
intensity (335) 
It scares me when I become 
short of breath. (ASI-R) 
“If I became short of breath for no reason / I think I 
would be very fearful/  
Behavior 
occurrence 
(322) 
When I notice that my heart is 
beating rapidly, I worry I 
might have a heart attack. 
(ASI-R) 
“Um/ well I relax, I lie down /and I don’t really worry 
about having a heart attack. / So a little bit. / I’ve 
got used to it.”  
Cognition 
occurrence 
(343) 
I’d rather keep things the way 
they are than risk a 
disaster. (AABS).  
 
“... / No. / I like, I like change. / Um. / It unnerves 
me, makes me feel anxious. / I disagree very 
much on that one. / I wouldn’t say I totally 
disagree. / Uh, / ‘cause sometimes there are 
things, /you think “it’s better to just stay the 
same.” / 
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Table 3 
Bases for judgment formations in the ASI-R and AABS protocols, number of 
protocols (percent) 
  Scale  
Judgment Presence/ 
Absence 
ASI-R AABS Χ2 (1, N =384) 
Appraisals Present          30 (20.8)        127 (52.9)        38.33a 
Absent        114 (79.2)       113 (47.1)  
Cognition 
occurrence 
Present          30 (20.8)        25 (10.4)          2.43b 
Absent        114 (79.2)      215 (89.6)  
Behavior 
occurrence 
Present            5   (3.5)         15 (6.3)          1.41b 
Absent        139 (96.5)       225 (93.8)  
Feeling overall 
(occurrence or 
intensity) 
Present          82 (56.9)        29 (12.1)        88.14a 
Absent          62 (43.1)      211 (87.9)  
Feeling 
occurrence 
Present          70 (48.6)        24 (10.0)        72.58 a 
Absent          74 (51.4)      216 (90.0)  
Feeling 
intensity 
Present          24 (16.7)        10 ( 4.2)        17.43a 
Absent        120 (83.3)      230 (95.8)  
Note.  N = 144 protocols for the ASI-R and 240 for the AABS.  Feeling occurrence 
and intensity do not sum to feeling overall as some protocols received both codes. 
a corrected p < .001;   b ns 
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Table 4 
 
Order of response selection relative to other think aloud codes, number of 
protocols (percent) 
 
 
Scale 
 
 
Order of response selection 
 
None stated 
 
 
Without any 
other codes 
 
Prior to all other 
codes 
 
After all other 
codes 
 
 
AABS 
 
13 (5.4) 
 
61 (25.4) 
 
94 (39.2) 
 
72 (30.0) 
 
ASIR 
 
13 (9.0) 23 (16.0) 30 (20.8) 78 (54.2) 
 
Note.  N of protocols = 144 total for the ASI-R and 240 total for the AABS.  Χ2 (3, N 
= 384) = 28.23, corrected p = .017. 
 
 
